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Abstract—Proving the efficacy of certification standards?
I. INTRODUCTION
Having a formal background, the unplanned experiment
I would like to propose to assess the efficacy of standards
for safety critical software would be to formally prove the
following theorem: ”if a software conforms to a standard, then
it is correct”. My favorite application domain is aerospace, so
I propose to place this experiment in the DO-178 context. I do
not pretend this ”experiment” is possible, but I hope that trying
to formally express the problem will help in understanding
some things about it (as it is usually the case when using
formal methods in general).
II. CERTIFICATION GOAL AND MEANS
In this section, we first describe the different elements that
are at stake in a certification context. We state the goal of
certification, describe existing means with respect to that goal,
in order to try to make the link between goal and means in
the next section.
A. Goal of certification
The item that is under scrutiny is the embedded software, it
is the one that is the target of certification (the one that should
execute correctly). And the goal of certification is to ensure
that this software indeed executes correctly, with respect to a
set of system requirements. We forget here abour some aspects
of certification, such as planning, configuration management,
quality assurance, we essentially focus on verification
B. DO-178: existing means
DO-178 [1] does not prescribe a specific development
process, but instead identifies important activities and design
considerations throughout a development process and defines
objectives for each of these. DO-178 distinguishes develop-
ment processes from integral processes that are meant to ensure
correctness, control, and confidence of the software life cycle
processes and their outputs. The verification process is part of
the integral processes along with configuration management
and quality assurance. Four processes are identified as com-
prising the software development processes in DO-178:
• The software requirements process develops High
Level Requirements (HLR) from the outputs of the
system process;
• The software design process develops Low Level
Requirements (LLR) and Software Architecture from
the HLR;
• The software coding process develops source code
from the software architecture and the LLR;
• The software integration process loads executable
object code into the target hardware for hard-
ware/software integration.
Each of these processes is a step towards the actual software
product.
The results of the four development processes must be
verified. Detailed objectives are defined for each step of the
development, with some objectives defined on the output of a
development process itself and some on the compliance of this
output to the input of the process that produced it. For example,
LLR shall be accurate and consistent, compatible with the tar-
get computer, verifiable, conformed to requirements standards,
and they shall ensure algorithm accuracy. Furthermore, LLR
shall be compliant and traceable to HLR.
III. WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO PROVE
If we want to formally assess the efficacy of DO-178, it
would ideally consist in showing that:
• the identified parts of the development processes satify
the certification objectives,
implies that
• the embedded software is correct.
A. Making the link
If we try to make the link between targetted goal and
existing means, we can identify two dimensions and four
different levels. The two dimensions are the representation of
the software and the definition of objectives for this software.
The four levels are the following:
• the embedded software itself,
• all the elements of processes that were developed to
produce this software (requirements, design, etc),
• the certification argument that includes part of the
development processes elements and the justification
of the certification objectives,
• the certification standard that specifies the expected
content of the certification argument.
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B. Focus
In the following of the paper, we will forget about some
aspects of certification. We will in particular ignore the as-
sessment of the certification argument by certification author-
ities,this assessment involves human issues that we consider
out of scope of our formal experiment. We will focus on the
fact that the certification standard proposes to evaluate the
embedded software by looking at some properties of some
elements of the process used to produce this software.
IV. CERTIFICATION AS A FORM OF ABSTRACTION
We propose to formalise a certification standard as a form
of abstraction. In formal verification, when a property cannot
be verified on an artifact, a possible solution is to define an
abstraction that is applied to the artifact and the property in
order to obtain a model that is tractable using the verification
technique. Abstract interpretation for example [3] proposes to
define an abstraction of the semantics of a program, abstraction
that is defined with respect to the property to be verified (for
example, if the property addresses the sign of the result of
a multiplication, all the variables can be abstracted by their
sign).
Certification is the definition of an abstraction. As the
correction of an embedded software cannot be verified, DO-
178 defines an abstraction: the verification of correction is
abstracted by the verification of objectives on HLR, LLR,
software architecture, source code and executable object code.
The standard is the definition of the abstraction itself, as
represented on Figure 1.
A. Charcateristics of an abstraction.
Three characteristics are important for the definition of an
abstraction:
• the abstraction is sound: it defines more behaviors than
the actual behaviors of the program, so that when a
property is verified on the abstract program,it is also
true of the concrete one;
• the abstraction is sufficiently abstract to compute
properties efficiently;
• it is sufficiently precise to provide good answers.
When the abstraction is too wide, a certain number
of potential errors are found in the abstract program
that are not reachable by the concrete program, the so
called false alarms.
Soundness is essential, the other two characteristics express
a compromise between precision and tractability.
B. Transposition to certification
If we try to transpose the three charcateristics of abstrac-
tion to certification, it would require to assess the following
questions:
• is the abstraction defined by certification sound?
• is it tractable in practice?
• is it precise enough or does it imply a lot of false
alarms?
Fig. 1. Certification as an abstraction
The answer to the second and third questions are mostly
positive. Even if the cost of DO-178 certification is high for the
most critical certification levels, this certification is tractable
in practice. Precision is not an issue in practice. There are no
complaints on errors that would be detected at abstract level
(by the certification process) and that would not be an effective
problem at the concrete level. It does not mean there is no
such case, but that they are not an issue in practice (during
the writing of DO-333 [2], some debates took place on the
necessity of the removing of dead code in case of formally
proven code, this could be a potential example of false alarm).
The answer to the first question is not so positive. There
are cases where bugs were detected in software that had pre-
viously been certified. The abstraction defined by certification
is thus not sound. However, it is difficult to know if these
bugs were due to a justification of the certification objectives
that was not sufficiently thorough (the activities defined to
reach the objective were not sufficient); or to a lack in the
definition of the certification objectives themselves. It may
be that the abstraction defined by certification is sound but
that the ”computation” of this abstraction is not correct. In
order to be able to distinguish between the two, it would be
necessary to formalise this abstraction and to study its property
(demonstrate soundness).
V. CONCLUSION
If we consider certification as a form of abstraction, and try
to determine if it is a ”good” abstraction, we first can claim that
it performs well on the usability aspect: certification looks like
a good compromise between precision and tractability. How-
ever, a formalisation of this abstraction would be necessary to
decide if it is a sound abstraction. And this formalisation would
require in particular to formalise the notion of ”correctness”
of software (compliance to system requirements only?) which
is important because we saw that an abstraction is in general
dedicated to a given property.
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